In each case, it is presumed that the "self' is one: body and soul distinct but integrated, a whole human. It is also presumed that the self is finite and mortal. "You are dust, and to dust you shall return" (Gen 3:20). There is, as yet, no clear concept of an "immortal soul."
There is, however, an acknowledgement of the self as a creature of God in need of Divine help and sustenance, and a sinner requiring Divine mercy; and in the New Testament as a redeemed being who is saved and renewed by and in Jesus Christ. "We know that our old self [anthropos] was crucified with him so that the sinful body might be destroyed . . ." (Rom 6:6). The term used in the Scriptures, besides soul as life-principle (Hebrew nephesh, Greek psyche) is "human being" (Greek: anthropos), rather than "self."
What follows is clearly a paradoxical understanding of human dignity and human misery: we are made by God, and reflect his goodness; we spoil his handiwork by our sins; we are saved and "made new" byJesus Christ. And the Good News (Gospels) brings with it an exhortation: to renounce sin and return to God inJesus. This is not a philosophical assertion. It is rather a call to radical conversion of mind and heart. The Philosophical-Theological Definitions: the "Self' as Person A shift occurred in the "self' paradigm as Hellenistic philosophical ideas were introduced into medieval Christian theology. It becomes obvious in the definitions given to the words "soul" (Latin: anima) and "person" (Greek and Latin: persona), and these two words, though maintained to be different, are sometimes used almost interchangeably. This term "person" is seldom mentioned in the New Testament, and did not become a technical term for Christian thought until the advent of Greek conciliar theology. Strangely enough, this took place with the discussions and debates surrounding the dogmas of Trinity (three Persons in one Nature) and Incarnation (two Natures in one Person).2 As Hellenistic reflection in philosophical theology turned from the subject of God to that of the human being, the human person as image of God takes on an inner core of spiritual substance: in the words of Boethius, "an individual substance of a rational nature."3 St. Thomas Aquinas further developed this definition to explain that "individual substance" is that which is complete, subsists by itself, and is separated from others. 4 And the Western person has tended since to take himself or herself as a being with unique individuality and immortal personality, distinct and different from one another and from God. He or she has now become aware of his or her own "immortal soul," the ground of his or her personhood. At the same time, however, the distinction between soul and body has been made rather radically, and the dualist tendency is increased. 5 The question of the immortality of the soul is primarily decided in a priori fashion: the soul is immortal because it is not material, and therefore spiritual and imperishable. The reasons for this decision are however moral and theological: to explain the fact of human freedom, and to assure moral responsibility and justice after this life. While "soul" and "person" are not exactly identical, the person owes his or her worth mainly to the immortal soul. But the definition of the soul's immortality tends to separate it more and more from the body, which is corruptible. A dualist tendency in defining personhood is entrenched, although the unity of the person is never entirely abandoned. However contrived this may be to a rationalistic mind the doctrine of the resurrection of bodies gives an example of how the eventual union of soul and body is to be expected, and will bring back the reintegrated person.
The very development of Christian doctrine with regard to personhood shows how "reason" and "faith" worked hand in hand: reason illuminating faith (in this case faith in the hypostatic union), and producing on the side a definition of the human person, based much more on theological speculation than on the data of experience. And the resurrection of bodies is again an example of how faith in turn could also be alleged to illuminate reason and explain a basic unity in the human person.
The Christian teaching of the person is generally considered as the foundation of the West's regard for human dignity and human freedom, even if oscillations have occurred in philosophical preferences between more or less emphasis on the "substantial core", as with the Thomists, or on "existential freedom", as with Duns Scotus in the past, and with Kierkegaard, Tillich and others more recently. A case might be made here for the shift into another paradigm of the self, which takes much more account of existential interpretations, and represents also a return to the Biblical sources. But neither the Whiteheadian emphasis on process and attacks on substance, nor the Kierkegaardian, Heideggerian and Tillichian preference for human activity and existential becoming, has significantly altered the basic Western assumptions concerning selfhood. On the other hand, the absence in the East of a corresponding doctrine of personhood might continue to be taken as the reason for the relative lack of regard and concern for human dignity and freedom.
The Ascetical-Mystical Teachings: the "Self' as Nothingness
The scholastic effort has been to define personhood philosophically, albeit for purposes of clarifying dogmatic positions on the Trinity and the Incarnation. There is also another effort, in spiritual and ascetic writings designed for the practical guidance of the Christian soul, to emphasize the dimension of human misery described in the Scriptures that was never denied by Conciliar theology. This is visible in such writings as Thomas a Kempis' The Imitation of Christ, in which the soul is exhorted to consider itself as nothing-and worse than nothing, because of sinfulness-in the presence of the overwhelming greatness and holiness of the Creator God. It is an effort especially encouraged by those spiritual writers, who prefer to emphasize human contingency and dependence on God rather than the dignity of personhood, in order to nurture humility and total surrender to God. One way of doing this is to meditate on death, so that the remembrance of our last state will help to instill in the individual its own sense of nothingness and helplessness; Christian ascetics are known to have encouraged meditation on death with the help of the human skull. "Each morning remember that you may not live until the evening, and in the evening, do not presume to promise yourself another day." And, "Keep yourself a stranger and pilgrim upon earth, . . . your heart free and lifted up to God, for here you have no abiding city" (Imitation of Christ, ch. 23).
Paradoxically, spiritual and mystical writers also claim that if humility is nurtured and the self is surrendered to God, then human beings as Divine images, may become transformed by grace and become more and more like God. In other words, we are encouraged to allow the Divine image, present in us like a seed, to grow into fruition. On this subject, Gregory of Nyssa (c.335-c.395 A.D.) of Greece wrote:
For he who has truly come to be in the image of God and who has in no way turned aside from the divine character bears in himself its distinguishing marks and shows in all things his conformity of the archetype; he beautifies his own soul with what is incorruptible, unchangeable, and shares in no evil at all."6 Here, the separation between creature and Creator is almost transcended, although the personal distinction between the two is allegedly maintained.
The ascetical-mystical paradigm of the self takes into account both the Biblical images and the philosophical-theological discussions, even if the Bible gives no explicit doctrine of asceticism.7 The core message of the paradigm, to deny oneself and convert to God in Jesus, may be regarded as representing a "constant" behind the historical shifts in thinking. However, varying emphases could be made on either human "nothingness" as creature and sinner-for the purpose of stirring up dispositions of dependence on God and repentance of one's own sinfulness-or on human glory as divine image, in order to strengthen spiritual morale by holding up the possibilities of self-transformation. Presumably, for the believer, the tension will always remain, until the spiritual combat of this life is over. However, emphasis on either one or the other end of the spiritual spectrum still makes a significant difference to one's own self-image and social behaviour as well as to how one might regard Buddhism.
I have called this the "ascetical-mystical" paradigm, while explaining that it differs from the other paradigms so far mentioned because of its historical constancy. I am associating the writers of ascetic and spiritual theology with the practical as well as speculative mystics, whose number is always fewer, on the presupposition that the former serve to prepare for mystical development. Historically speaking, this has not always been the case, and many ascetical writers have expressed reservations and even distrust of mysticism. If a distinction is to be made, one might say that the ascetical writers tend more to humble the soul, while the mystical writers tend more to exalt it. But they are usually regarded in association as representing more the dimension of transcendence in religion, over and against that of immanence. Sometimes, they may even be considered as antagonistic to the representatives of humanism, including Christian humanism, since they appear to demand more of human nature where the humanists seem to be satisifed with following human nature.
Interestingly, where Buddhism is concerned, and in spite of its primarily non-theistic character, we find plenty of demands made on human nature in terms of self-renunciation, even to the point of renouncing the "reality" of the self. Comparison with the spiritual-ascetic side of Christianity is therefore illuminating, especially since the language of asceticism and spirituality is not a precise one, but intended for a certain psychological conditioning. To be always told that one is nothing may be injurious to one's basic self-esteem and selfreliance, and we can understand why Nietszche regarded God and religion as the enemy of the life-instinct. Nietszche wanted a superman, one equal to the gods, to use the language of the mystics. Curiously, Nietszche found Buddhism attractive. Did it have anything to do with his final intellectual conclusion of nihilism, "the conviction of the nullity of the internal contradiction, futility and worthlessness of reality" ?8
III. THE BUDDHIST PARADIGMS
Turning from Christian to Buddhist paradigms, we shall discover that there are even more doctrinal ambiguities, disputed points on which there is, as yet, no firm scholarly consensus. What is clear is the absence of any positive teaching about an "immortal soul", or about substantial personhood, both in Theravada and in Mahayana. This is all the more significant on account of the Vedantic meaning associated with the Sanskrit word atman, (Pali: atta)9 which literally means breath/life, and is comparable to the Greek psyche. In the Upanishads, the atman is described as conscious, intelligent, and immortal. Indeed, the Vedantist sees the atman as fundamentally one with the Brahman; in Western language, the individual soul is regarded as one with the world soul. The Buddhist scriptures continue to make mention of words like the self (atta, atman) or the person (Pali: puggala, Sanskrit: pudgala), but give the words no philosophical meaning. The human individual is said to be made up of nama (literally, name), referring to the mental and emotional aspects, and rzpa (literally, form), referring to the physical aspects and the combined word, namarupa, represents the entire psycho-physical organism.
Is there the equivalent of a soul in Buddhism, and is this soul immortal? In fact, is there anything at all permanent about the namarapa that one may call the self which goes beyond the aggregation of physical, sensory and supersen- Theravada orthodoxy appears to have insisted on denying any permanence to the self. An early attempt on the part of certain Buddhists themselves to give more "reality" to the self, by using the term puggala to signify some dimension of "personhood", only ended in becoming labelled a heresy. 4 Contemporary Buddhist scholars have continued to recognize this. As Walpola Rahula, himself a monk from Sri Lanka, puts it:
Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self, or Atman. According to the teaching of the Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality. . . .
The Thai monk, Khantipalo Bhikkhu, supports this assertion:
There is no reincarnation in Buddhism because there is no unchanging spiritual entity; no soul can ultimately be found which can re-incarnate. Buddhism does not make a dichotomy of the perishable body on the one hand and an eternal soul on the other. The Buddha's insight discovered that both mind and body are inter-related and continually changing streams of events in which no unchanging soul or self as an ultimate principle, can be found.
(II) THE CASE FOR A SELF:
But is this necessarily the case? Is the only "self' merely this composite of aggregates, and is such a composite adequate to assure what we may call, for lack of other words, personhood, individuality, and the continuity between life cycles in samsara?
Interestingly, Caroline A. F Rhys Davids has insisted, against her husband's apparent views, that the doctrine of anatta only came with the "monkish tradition", and is not in accord with the Buddha's original message as given in his "folk gospel." According to her highly controversial thesis, the original goal of Buddhism was a positive goal: the affirmation of the self-she would prefer the English spirit as translation for tta-as a kind of immanent deity in the human being, making him or her a "real self." According to her, such a religious quest was no negative hankering after Nirvana.
[What was taught in Early Buddhism] was not nibbana, a vanishing Less in a vanishing atta. It was a persisting living on in that more which saw the quest as a man becoming more in the worlds. . . He goes on to quote Bhattacharya on the same subject:
Thus and in various other ways, too many to be mentioned, the existence of a permanent Self or atman, as accepted in other systems, was utterly denied by the Buddha, thereby pulling down the very foundation of desire where it can rest.19 Walpola Rahula also criticizes as vain attempts the efforts "to smuggle the idea of the self into the teaching of the Buddha, quite contrary to the spirit of Buddhism."
It is better to say frankly that one believes in an Atman or Self. Or one may even say that the Buddha was totally wrong in denying the existence of an Atman. But certainly it will not do for any one to try to introduce into Buddhism an idea which the Buddha never accepted, as far as we can see from the extant original texts.20
In spite of the teachings of contemporary Theravada scholars and monks, the question of Self or No-Self continues to trouble enquirers and scholars. Perez-Remon's recent book is another attempt, following in C. A. E Rhys Davids' footsteps, to prove the reality of a self in early Buddhism. After sifting through conflicting evidence in the scriptures-and he amasses all the evidence possible -he concludes that nowhere is this reality absolutely and explicitly denied, that the anatta doctrine given in the Nikayas does not actually deny the self as such but only selfhood as "empty of any ultimate value and to be repudiated." Besides, the denial is only of the "wrong" self, identified with the skandhas; the true self is never brought into question. And, according to him, this "true self' is transcendent and ineffable.21
For our purposes, whether Buddhism originally believed in a permanent self or not is mainly a historical question. What we may not neglect is the fact of Theravada belief not only through a long period of history but also as it stands today.
Given this fact then, how does Buddhism explain rebirth and even Nirvana? And how do believing Buddhists function in society, given their belief in anatta or anatman?
The answer to the first question lies in the doctrine of dependent origination, which explains the origin as well as cessation of pain. It is assumed that when ignorance exists, the aggregates come to be . . ., and so on down to birth, old age, death, grief. In the process of rebirth, it is not the atman that transmigrates, but the karma, the good and evil deeds themselves. And what happens when liberation from samsara takes place? What actually is Nirvana, and is there a "who" to enjoy it? These are again the difficult questions, to which various answers have been given, without arriving at any real con- In the texts of the New Wisdom school, we continue to read about the illusoriness of the self, which is compared to a reflection on a mirror. "As without the mirror one cannot see the reflected image of one's own face, so also the I without the medium of the skandhas." 25 In The Awakening of Faith, attributed to Asvaghosha, we also read:
Those who practice the various types of dhyana (meditation) . . . which are popular in the world will develop much attachment to their flavors and will be bound to the triple world because of their perverse view that atman is real. They are therefore the same as heretics .. .26
As to Nagarjuna's position, we have these words: "The self is not different from the stages [skandhas], nor identical with them; (there) is no self without the states, nor is it to be considered non-existent." And also: "The self does exist, the Buddhas have declared; they have taught the 'no-self doctrine too; they have (finally) taught that there is neither self nor non-self."27 Murti develops these paradoxical statements by saying:
Buddha's teaching is adjusted to the need of the taught as the medicine of the skilled physician is to the malady of the patient. He does not blindly . . .prescribe the remedy to all and sundry. He corrects those with a nihilistic tendency by affirming the self, as there is continuity of karma and its result; to those addicted to the dogmatic belief in a changeless substantial atman and who cling to it, he teaches the 'no-self doctrine' as an antidote; his ultimate teaching is that there is neither self nor not-self as these are subjective devices. 28 After such an explanation, one wonders whether it is still necessary to pursue the question. In the Lankavatara satra, which also is important for Ch'an Buddhism, there is the term of "mind only" (cittamatra): "Up to the realm of Brahma, all is mind-only, I say. Outside mind-only, Brahma and so forth cannot be apprehended." 30 So long as these terms are used with reference to the universe as a whole, with no subject/object differentiation, it is difficult to see the particular reference to the self. But the Chinese Ch'an (apanese: Zen) school, with its practical bent, focuses on the quest itself for direct intuition into nature, especially human nature, regarded as the abode of the absolute and the seat of enlightenment (Sanskrit: bodhi, Chinese: wu, Japanese: saton).
In Ch'an Buddhism, there is the expression "your original face"-the face before your birth-basically a riddle or kung-an (Japanese: koan). As an expression, it represents a more "personalized" form of pointing toward the ineffable, a form which evokes an original "self." It is said that the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng confronted his enemy Hui-ming with this question: "Not thinking of good, not thinking of evil, just at this moment, what is your original face before your mother and father were born?" 31 The context in which the "original face" is mentioned is also significant, as there is reference here to "someone" who is thinking of neither good nor evil. There is, of course, also the reference to a possibly "transient" discovery of the "original face", made "just at this moment". But the metaphor of the original face, the face one had before one's birth, or even the birth of one's parents, is tantalizing, and intended for "waking up" the consciousness to the bridging of any gap between the self and the other, the relative and the absolute.
Daisetz Suzuki, the greatJapanese interpreter of Mahayana Buddhism in the West, has asserted that just as early Buddhism denied the existence of an "egosubstance" called the atman and applied a rigorously analytical method to individual existence which came up with the theory of the "non-ego", later Buddhism reasserted the existence of the atman, by its teaching of a "metaphysical Self which casts its reflection on ordinary consciousness."32 Masumi Shimizu (1981) has sought to present the case for the Self in Mahayana Buddhism, as this is understood by Japanese Buddhists-especially Suzuki and the philosophers of the so-called Kyoto school. Following a paradoxical logic, he asserts that the No-self doctrine should be understood with the help of the Emptiness doctrine of Nagarjuna, which emphasizes the dialectical identity of Samsara and Nirvana. According to Shimizu, the Mahayana Buddhist understands the insistence given in the Anatta doctrine regarding the illusoriness of our presumed substantial Selfhood, that to which we cling, and because of which we suffer anxiety, only as a means to help us live in such a way as to recover our True and Original Selfhood, that which is also called Thusness (Tathata).
Actually, the term True Self (Chinese: chen-wo) does not appear to have been technically a Buddhist term. It is better considered as a metaphor, either for the acceptance of the truth that the self is absent, as in Theravada, or for "moral transformation," that of realizing a morally authentic existence which is more in accord with the Buddhist dharma, or for such more specifically Mahayana notions as "thusness," "mind," or "your original face." In one or another way, these have been used to refer to the ultimate reality which lies at the heart of the teachings of all the major schools of Mahayana Buddhism.
The problem with such a "thusness" when referring to ultimate reality is that it is beyond differentiation, including the subject/object duality. Should it be called the True Self, then it is also the "self' transcended, no longer separate from other "selves". It is a metaphysical Absolute, very close to the Western idea of God, except for not having a personal character. But can it also designate the individual, considered as that which gives unity to particular skandhas, that which is distinct from other individuals? Spiritual/Mystical Experience: Discovery of True Self?
To interpret the Tathata as Absolute is to interpret it metaphysically. But there can also be a psychological interpretation. For example, the Buddhist might seek the "True Self' in meditation or contemplation, paradoxically, of course, by contemplating the impermanence of all things, and the insubstantiality of one's own self. He or she may contemplate the body as a composite of elements subject to decay, of feelings as merely automatic responses to sense impressions, of the mind as vulnerable to agitation from within and distraction from without, and so on, and thus come to triumph over the former illusion of a "self," if only in a few fleeting moments of insight. These are the transient moments during which the individual awakens to the truth of things-and this includes the meaning of his or her fundamental character as "no-self." These are the moments when he or she may be said to have also achieved the state of "True Selfhood"-the word "selfhood" referring here more to a transient understanding of truth than to any permanent substrate. This is a state which may be lost, if the necessary precautions of moral and spiritual cultivation are not followed; conversely, it is also a state which may grow with the individual's deepening insights.
To understand such a view, let us remember that Buddhists see life not only from the perspective of suffering, but also from the perspective of death. Just as Christian spiritual teaching has encouraged meditations on death, so too did The aspect of life and the aspect of death are both equally real. Reality is that which appears as life and as death. It is life, it is death, and at the same time, in itself, is not life, and not death. It is to be called the non-duality of life and death.35
In this sense, we may represent Buddhism as viewing reality even more from the viewpoint of death than does Christianity, although the latter does it also.
True Selfhood need not only be realized in mystical experience. It could be achieved in ordinary life. For Spiritual life is lived in practical life; within the structures of existence, but without the bondage of these structures. The awareness of 'emptiness' is not a blank loss of consciousness, an inanimate empty space; rather it is the cognition of daily life without the attachment to it. ... Wisdom is not to be equated with mystical ecstasy; it is, rather, the joy of freedom in everyday existence. 36 If however, wisdom is not limited to mystical experience, then there is no reason to exclude wisdom from mysticism. Certain schools of Buddhism, especially Mahayana, are more attuned to the mystical than others. Ch'an Buddhism, in particular, is oriented to the enlightenment experience.
Understood in this way, the True Self is common to both Theravda and Mahayana Buddhism, being identified by some in the latter, as the metaphysical Absolute, especially as perceived in mystical experience. Here we see the convergence of a "smaller" self, or the "no-self' that is experienced in spiritual insight, and a "larger" self, or "absolute nothingness" that is identified with the universal Buddha-nature, and especially realized in mystical enlightenment.
IV. CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
Speaking historically, the earliest Christian paradigm of the self is much more of a common sense one, without much separation between soul and body. I find this question difficult to answer precisely but venture to say that the weight of tradition has helped to shape two rather different positions about the self, strengthening its identity and reality in the one case, and de-emphasizing it in the other. I do not, for example, perceive quite as much rapprochement as does de Silva. I believe that it is just as important to take account of the Theravadin effort to deny the self, as to discover an "original" affirmation of the self, or an eventual dialectical transcendence of the idea of the self. This is all the more so in a comparative study of paradigms which should not lose sight of the shifts of paradigms. Besides, the question posed by Mrs. Rhys Davids is an important one; by denying the self, whether ontologically or psychologically or religiously, Buddhist philosophy could be encouraging anti-humanism, even if the great Buddhist spiritual masters are able to find and live their "True Self".
There are some clearly basic theological differences underlying Christian and Buddhist teachings. In one tradition, there is the fundamental difference between the creature and the Creator; in the other, the absence of any creation theory, as well as the affirmation of a rebirth theory which embraces all sentient beings. But these differences have not obscured the quest shared by the two religions: the spiritual quest for self-transcendence, which begins with a recognition of one's own "nothingness," in order to grow in Godlikeness or True Selfhood. This impulse for self-transcending, albeit moved by differing intellectual persuasions, is common to both Christianity and Buddhism. Both traditions use similar topics of meditation to induce similar mental and spiritual states of awareness, such as human nothingness.
Fundamentally, Buddhism and Christianity resemble each other most as practical doctrines, aimed at helping the human person. Christianity has tended in its history to do so after first offering the answers to the big questions about the nature of personhood and the existence of God. Buddhism has offered certain analyses of the human condition, and of ways of coping with it, but without as much emphasis on dotrinal clarity or unambiguity. Until today, we have no firm scholarly consensus on such questions as the Buddhist doctrine of the self-or is it the non-self? and of its survival after nirvana-is it extinction or bliss? Indeed, we do not yet have a clear and firm scholarly consensus as well on the meaning of the Buddhist Nirvana.
TheJapanese scholar Hajime Nakamura has this to say:
In Buddhism the entire stress lies on the mode of living, on the saintliness of life, on the removal of attachment to the world. A merely theoretical proposition, such as "There is no ego", would be regarded as utterly sterile and useless. All Buddhists follow the Buddha in wanting to teach how to lead a selfless life. Rational analysis is no more than a tool which is justified in its products. That is why there are so many teachings even on one sub- Perhaps this is the way we should regard the Buddhist approach to all the big questions of life. Perhaps Buddhism seeks, not to give answers, but to ask us to look for the answers from within the depths of our own beings, not by reasoning but by going beyond reasoning, an intuitive meditation. In that sense, doctrine is to be regarded as skill-in-means, to awaken the seeker to a higher truth. Allegedly, the historical Buddha always emphasized the importance of healing one's wounds rather than of finding out who has inflicted them. To the probing questions of his disciples, he has often responded with silence. He cuts the figure, not of a metaphysician, not even of a theologian, but of a compassionate teacher and saviour. He comes not to give answers, but to tell us where and how to find them.
On the other hand, Christianity has offered its believers answers to many big problems about life and the world: creation, trinity, incarnation, redemption, resurrection. In the past, it has even defined these answers in precise dogmatic formulas, as though it had resolved all the mysteries surrounding these problems. Only the mystics have cried out, with Meister Eckhart, that "God cannot be named," and withJohn of the Cross, "Nada, nada." And in fact, how much does Christianity know for sure, that it could say so much: about there being a God, about that God being personal, being threein-one, and about the human soul being a "spiritual substance?" Might it, perhaps, learn from Buddhism to be content with more doctrinal ambiguity, to show diffidence of language, to move beyond the efforts of theological definitions, and to regard doctrinal propositions as human parables, "skill-inmeans," that awaken us to a higher truth? And when this happens, we might perhaps have better answers to the questions regarding the future prospects for dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism.45 
